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The IWT and the UNWC: Commonalities and Differences 
 
Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi1 
ABSTRACT 
Amid global water scarcity and a surge in population, leading nations have started racing 
to occupy freshwater resources around the world. While there remains no international 
agreement applying universally worldwide, almost all major international watercourses 
and powerful nations remain out of the scope of any sort of legal obligation. Bilateral and 
multilateral treaties have become the governing legal framework to regulate freshwater 
utilization. In this context, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) and the Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (DALTA) play a significant role, serving not only as the 
guiding documents to form treaty laws or agreements, but also as customary international 
law in situations where there is no available regional legal framework. These instruments 
have achieved this accredited status by developing universally acclaimed principles, 
obligations, and duties on co-riparian states and aquifer states, that in their core senses are 
equitable, juridical, and impartial. These principles and obligations are flexible and 
accommodate diverse evolving aspects of water apportionment. Accordingly, this paper 
has been devised to set out the international law of freshwater. Herein, significant 
implications, such as how this legal framework has been developed, are explained and 
annotated with intrinsic principles. The principle of the equitable and reasonable 
                                                     
1 Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
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utilization of international watercourses, and the obligation not to harm other concerned 
states, will form the underlying emphasis in this paper. The significance of the regional 
legal agreement, that is, the IWT, will be briefly explored in comparison with the 
UNWC, considering the principles, obligations, and duties that are universally acclaimed 
and, more importantly, that are established by the UNWC. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international watercourses of the Indus river basin are acknowledged to be one of the 
greatest canal systems in the world, accommodating 20 million hectares of irrigable lands 
for agrarian purposes.2 India, China, and Pakistan are its major co-riparian states, sharing 
most of its water, and China is an upper riparian state to India in the same way that India 
is an upper riparian state to Pakistan.3 While China manages its sources of water flows, 
India remains the prime riparian to manage water flows through its headworks, and 
Pakistan only shares its basins. Afghanistan holds 6 percent of the watercourses of the 
Indus rivers, China holds 8 percent, India holds 39 percent, and Pakistan holds 47 percent.4 
The partition of Hindustan in 1947, which bifurcated the enormous state into Pakistan and 
India, made complex geological demarcations; the headworks of the Pakistani irrigation 
system lie in Indian-occupied Kashmir, which remains an area disputed between the hostile 
neighboring states.5 Consequently, to resolve the conflicting interests, in 1960 the World 
                                                     
2 ASHOK SWAIN, MANAGING WATER CONFLICT: ASIA, AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST 46 
(2004). 
3 IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN, 198 
(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016). 
4 BJORN-OLIVER MAGSIG, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW & THE QUEST FOR COMMON 
SECURITY 185 (2015). 
5 Hemant Kumar Padhiari & Vishwa Ballabh, Inter-State Water Disputes and the 
Governance Challenge, in GOVERNANCE OF WATER: INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES & 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 174, 179 (Vishwa Ballabh ed., 2008). 
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Bank brokered a water sharing treaty between India and Pakistan, which is known as the 
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).6 Through this treaty, the six major rivers—the Indus, Ravi, 
Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, and Beas—along with many other smaller tributaries, were 
equitably allocated for the unrestricted use of their respective states.7 
In more recent times, the surge in population in both countries has amplified water 
requirements for consumptive as well as for nonconsumptive usages.8 India has repeatedly 
violated the treaty by installing storage and power production facilities on the western 
rivers, which were allocated to Pakistan for its exclusive and unrestricted use.9 India 
categorizes these violations as sincere necessities by arguing that, since the IWT is almost 
60 years old, it does not cater for other contingent aspects of water apportionment, so it is 
crucial to amend and modify the IWT.10 In this context, it becomes appropriate to note the 
modern aspects that should be encompassed in devising an international water 
apportionment treaty, and whether the IWT accommodates or respects these aspects within 
its prescribed procedures, principles, and duties. 
To explore the international legal framework of established principles and obligations, it is 
suitable to review its progression and its contextual impetuses. All human beings rely on 
fresh water, and only 0.0044 percent of all water globally comes from rivers and 10.85 
                                                     
6 BRIG V.P. MALHOTRA, SECURITY & DEFENCE RELATED TREATIES OF INDIA 273 (2010). 
7 The Indus Waters Treaty art. 2-3, India-Pak., Sep. 19, 1960, 126 U.N.T.S. 6032. 
8 See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 3, at 59. 
9 GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT 70 (2007). 
10 SATISH KUMAR, INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY ANNUAL REVIEW 2013 (2014). 
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percent from shallow groundwaters that are accessible and drinkable. The rest of the water 
worldwide is not safe for drinking purposes or is inaccessible, such as seawater and waters 
in glaciers or deep underground.11 With a 1.11 percent annual growth rate in population,12 
natural water resources are finite in their capacity to cater for human needs. Rivers often 
have regional transboundary basins, and for the same reason nations often share rivers with 
other nations.13 Amid growing water usage for domestic, industrial, irrigation, power 
production, and storage purposes, a race for water navigation, storage and runoff projects 
is emerging. This in turn leads to conflicts over water among co-riparian states over 
safeguarding their national water interests.14 These interests are not only indispensable to 
guarantee the necessity of life but also critical for national economic security. 
It is difficult to believe that there is no international unanimity over any set of rules and 
regulations for sharing transboundary fresh river waters.15 No established framework 
restricts or restrains countries from exploiting the waters of lower riparian countries by 
constructing massive storage facilities or by navigating river waters away from their course 
                                                     
11 Adam Nieman, All the Accessible Fresh Water in the World, CARBON VISUALS (Sept. 
24, 2014), https://perma.cc/H7JL-FMWY. 
12 Current World Populations, WORLDOMETERS, https://perma.cc/J7BX-2FE3 (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2017) 
13 PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT 299 (2nd ed., 
2013); see also MANOHAR PAWAR, WATER & SOCIAL POLICY 42 (2014). 
14 V. I. Grover, Water: Global Common Global Problems, 380 SCIENCE PUB,  (2006). 
15 See PARK, supra note 13, at 299–300; see also PAWAR, supra note 13, at 42–43. 
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even at the start of the twenty-first century.16 
More than 100 largest rivers of the world are stretched across the boundaries of more than 
two nations, and they share their basins with neighboring countries.17 The Mekong, Niger, 
Congo-Zambezi, Nile, Amazon, Brahmaputra, and Indus rivers are the largest international 
rivers.18 As a result, large and powerful states such as China and India have begun efforts 
to gain freshwater reservoirs by building huge storage facilities to control water reserves 
and thereby regional economics and geopolitics.19 
China has built more than 80,000 dams, with 4,000 medium-sized storage and navigational 
projects, of which more than a hundred are huge.20 By comparison, India has constructed 
more than 5,000 large storage and navigational projects on river waters, of which 50 are 
immensely large dams.21 Projects over shared waters have generally been constructed 
                                                     
16 PARK, supra note 13, at 299; see also, PAWAR, supra note 13, at 42. 
17 Anthony Turton, The Southern African Hydropolitical Complex, in MANAGEMENT OF 
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS & LAKES 21, 64 (Olli Varis et al. eds., 2008). 
18 Kazuaki Hori & Yoshiki Saito, Classification, Architecture, and Evolution of Large-
River Deltas, in LARGE RIVERS: GEOMORPHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 75, 76-78 (Avijit 
Gupta ed., 2007). 
19 BÉRÉNICE GUYOT-RÉCHARD, SHADOW STATES: INDIA, CHINA & HIMALAYAS, 1910-
1962, at 270 (2017). 
20 China, INT’L RIVERS, https://perma.cc/5D2G-9MKA (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
21 Ananda Banerjee, How Many Dams Does India Need?, LIVEMINT (May 25, 2015) 
https://perma.cc/RDt7-D66F. 
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without the approval or consent of the lower riparian states.22 These, in turn, negatively 
affect the lower riparian states’ environment and economies, and disturb human settlements 
in both upper and lower riparian nations.23 These practices also restrict freshwater fish 
migration and prevent clean water use for agricultural and domestic purposes in the lower 
riparian nations. Consequently, India, as a lower riparian state to China, fears Chinese 
construction works over the Brahmaputra River, as there is no bilateral treaty among these 
states to safeguard each other’s water interests.24 Similarly, Pakistan as a lower riparian 
state to India, continually protests the illicit construction works on the western rivers that 
were allocated to Pakistan by the IWT, a bilateral water sharing treaty between India and 
Pakistan.25 
Similarly, in Africa, Ethiopia is constructing the largest regional dam on the waters of the 
Nile River. As a result, lower riparian states such as Egypt and Sudan are contesting its 
                                                     
22 NAROTTAM P. BANSKOTA, SOUTH ASIA TRADE & ENERGY SECURITY: THE ROLE OF 
INDIA 81 (2012). 
23 Jayante Bandyopadhyay, Restoration of Ecological Status of Himalayam Rivers in 
China and India: The Case of the Two Mother Rivers – The Yellow and the Ganges, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE HIMALAYAS TO THE OCEAN 69, 70–80 
(Shikui Dong et al. eds., 2017). 
24 Uttam Kumar Sinha, Towards Riparian Rationality: an Indian Perspective, in CHINA–
INDIA RELATIONS: COOPERATION & CONFLICT 167, 168 (Kanti Bajpai et al. eds., 2016). 
25 ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 2, at 54–55  
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legality.26 Likewise, already devastated by war, the state of Syria is further threatened by 
construction work on the Euphrates by the Turkish regime for storage purposes, which also 
serves the political ends of their ongoing armed conflict.27 
Of all river basins of the world, 263 rivers share their basins across borders; the population 
residing in countries with international rivers encompass 40 percent of the world 
population.28 Some rivers, including the Nile, Niger, Rhine, Zambezi, and others, have 
more than eight co-riparian states, sharing river basins with several nations 
simultaneously.29 Even more shockingly, international rivers—containing 60 percent of 
global river water—do not have any sort of agreement or treaty between the co-riparian 
states.30 So there is a legal vacuum regarding the use and sharing of freshwater 
internationally. 
                                                     
26 JOHN MARKAKIS, ETHIOPIA: THE LAST TWO FRONTIERS 339–344 (2011). 
27 ROY L. NERSESIAN, ENERGY ECONOMICS: MARKETS, HISTORY, AND POLICY 421 
(2016); see also Jane V. Hall & Darwin C. Hall, Environmental Resource Scarcity and 
Conflict, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR & PEACE 177, 188 (Murray Wolfson ed.,, 
1998). 
28 JACQUELINE VAUGHN, CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 94 (2007). 
29 Fred Pearce, A Global Treaty on Rivers, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Nov. 19, 2012), 
[https://perma.cc/8MSN-E2UK].  
30 Id. 
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Accordingly, this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 1 will explore the regional 
legal framework regarding the water apportionment of international watercourses. Here, 
treaty laws and experts’ opinions will be assessed. 
Section 2 will start with a global view of the international law of water sharing. Within this 
section, Section 2.1 will briefly touch upon customary international law and Section 2.2 
will elaborate the developments in international water sharing law. 
Subsequently, Section 3 will give a brief overview of international instruments. Section 3.1 
will explain the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (UNWC) and briefly go into why it was formed. Section 3.2 
will give a similarly brief analysis of the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers (DALTA). 
Section 4 will expand upon the key principles and obligations that have been established 
through UNWC and DALTA. Section 4.1 will explain the “principle of equitable and 
reasonable water utilization” and 4.2 will define the “obligation of not to cause harm.” 
Section 5 will elaborate on the procedural duties laid down in UNWC and DALTA. Here, 
various aspects of water apportionment and utilization will be explored, such as the duty 
of a state to cooperate with other concerned states, the duty to notify other concerned states 
about planned activities, and the duty not to pollute and harm the environment. 
Section 6 will provide a brief analysis of the provisions of DALTA, as a reflection of the 
same notions of principles, obligations, and duties of the UNWC. 
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Finally, Section 7 will explore the equivalence between the IWT and the UNWC, with 
regard to the principles, obligations, and duties that are universally acclaimed and, more 
importantly, established by the UNWC. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL LAW OF WATER 
This section will elaborate the regional legal framework pertaining to water apportionment. 
This overview will demonstrate the scarcity of water, while discussing the treaty laws of 
various regions, while weighing expert opinions within the same equation. 
Scholars and futurists alike have suggested that water will be the most important 
commodity in the future.31 In only the last five decades, the use of water has tripled across 
the globe, mainly for agrarian purposes, owing to the surge in population.32 Consequently, 
environmental devastation is put down to navigational and storage usages of water. 
Therefore, water scarcity in the future is considered imminent and experts believe that 
water conflicts and inadvertent water wars are inevitable.33 
Nonetheless, with a reasonable and sophisticated approach, these conflicts can be managed 
                                                     
31 Paolo Turrini, Virtual Water: A Global Economic Solution to a Local Environmental 
and Political Problem, in CHARTING THE WATER REGULATORY FUTURE: ISSUES, 
CHALLENGES, AND DIRECTIONS 55, 55-56 (Julien Chaisse ed., 2017). 
32 Michael Gordy, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: RUMINATIONS 
ON A WAY FORWARD 3 (2016). 
33 See Turrini, supra note 31, at 55–56. 
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peacefully, through co-riparian states entering into water sharing treaties.34 In the last half- 
century, more than 150 water sharing treaties have been formed, which have restrained the 
number of water conflicts to fewer than forty.35 This is mainly because nations across the 
globe prefer predictable outcomes, and choose peace over war. 
It is interesting to note that the first treaty formed to end armed conflict was promulgated 
in 2500 B.C. over the sharing of the waters of the Tigris River, between Lagash and 
Umma.36 Since then, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations has 
reported that over 3,500 water sharing treaties have been agreed over international rivers 
since A.D. 805.37 Hitherto, such treaties have largely focused on the navigational purpose 
of waters, whereas modern treaties look upon the non-navigational uses of waters, such as 
water usage for consumptive, protective, and storage purposes.38 
Legal mechanisms of water sharing treaties and agreements have survived conflicts and 
                                                     
34 DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE FIVE HORSEMEN OF THE MODERN WORLD: CLIMATE, FOOD, 
WATER, DISEASE, AND OBESITY 251 (2016). 
35 Id. 
36 David P. Forsythe, Water and Politics in the Tigris – Euphrates Basin: Hope for 
Negative Learning, in WATER SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 167, 172 (Jean A. Cahan 
ed., 2017). 
37 VELMA I. GROVER, WATER: A SOURCE OF CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 29 (2007). 
38 Alexandre Kiss, Public Lectures on International Environmental Law, in THE LAW OF 
ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6, 12 (Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. eds., 2005). 
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wars across the globe.39 For instance, regulations and negotiations over the waters of the 
Mekong River through the Mekong River Commission survived the Vietnam War among 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.40 Similarly, water sharing negotiations over the 
Jordan River have endured armed conflicts and warfare between Jordan and Israel. 
Analogously, the Indus Waters Treaty over six major rivers feeding billions of people has 
subsisted despite ongoing hostilities and two major wars between the hostile neighboring 
states of Pakistan and India.41 
Furthermore, the legal framework over the waters of the Nile River was agreed upon in 
1999 by ten co-riparian states, to justifiably use shared water resources in the hope of 
developing regional peace and economic security.42 Consistently, for the same reasons, the 
co-riparian states of the Niger River agreed to a similar legal framework to establish an 
                                                     
39 Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, The World’s International Freshwater 
Agreements: Historical Developments and Future Opportunities, in ATLAS OF 
INTERNATIONAL FRESHWATER AGREEMENTS 1, 3-5 (2002). 
40 Michael Richardson, China and the Potential for Conflict Over Water Among Eurasian 
States, in WATER ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: PRESENT TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
27, 30 (Lee Poh Onn ed., 2013). 
41 Giordano, supra note 39, at 3-5. 
42 Assefa M. Melesse et al., Hydrological Variability and Climate of the Upper Blue Nile 
River Basin, in NILE RIVER BASIN: HYDROLOGY, CLIMATE AND WATER USAGE 3, 14 
(Aseffa M/ Melesse ed., 2011). 
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impartial mechanism over the use of fresh waters.43 These mutually agreed legal 
frameworks across the globe reflect the global need for an equitable and impartial higher 
authority or legal framework over the use of freshwater resources. An international 
organization to envisage the neutrality and justice of water sharing through an impersonal 
instrument would be ideal. Comparably, in the parallel legal world of armed conflict the 
UN Charter is an international instrument to regulate the use of force.44 
That there have been over 3,500 water sharing treaties is in itself a great achievement of 
civilization over the course of history to avoid greater conflicts.45 But putting these 
instruments under scrutiny will demonstrate the imperfections and frailties within them. 
These characteristics include the inadequacy of monitoring regimes, the ineffectiveness of 
enforcements against treaty violations, and the lack of adequate mechanisms to forestall 
the changing facets of politics, economies, technologies, and other needs.46 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FRESHWATER 
To fill the gap in the legal frameworks over the world, in 1997 the United Nations devised 
the United Nations Convention on Non-Navigational Watercourses (also known as the UN 
                                                     
43 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES  91 
(OCED ed., 2013). 
44 U.N. Charter. 
45 JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING & TRANSFORMING WATER 
CONFLICTS 62 (2009). 
46 Id. 
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Watercourses Convention and referred to here as the UNWC) for the sole purpose of 
equitably sharing fresh waters among co-riparian states.47 Within this legal framework, the 
UN envisioned two basic legal principles over water sharing among co-riparian states. 
These include the principle of the “equitable and reasonable utilization of watercourses” 
and the principle of “the obligation not to cause significant harm” to neighboring and co-
riparian states.48 Largely, this framework is a guidance instrument for states, whereas 
nations establish their water sharing mechanisms themselves.49 
However, it is unanimously agreed among academics that further work on this instrument 
is required to develop an enforcement mechanism and to administer punitive approaches 
against violators of treaties and bilateral agreements.50 Conversely, broader perspectives—
of societal and normative changing aspects—and resonating water attribution 
characteristics—including but not limited to changing dynamics of river basins—are 
                                                     
47 Daniel Malzbender & Anton Earle, Southern Africa, in THE UN WATERCOURSES 
CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY 
WATER MANAGEMENT 112, 117 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 
2013). 
48 Id. 
49 Patricia Wouters, Addressing Water Security Challenges: The International Law ‘Duty 
to Cooperate’ as a Limit on Absolute State Sovereignty, A HISTORY OF WATER: 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 334, 338 (Terje Tvedt et al. eds., 2015). 
50 MAGSIG, supra note 4, at 27. 
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incorporated within the framework.51 This section will elaborate on international water 
sharing law. Here, Section 2.1 will briefly touch upon what constitutes customary 
international law. Later, Section 2.2 will elaborate on the developments of international 
law in regard to water apportionment and utilization among co-riparian states. 
 
A. Customary International Law 
 
The main determination of the UNWC and DALTA was to establish fundamental 
principles for laws regarding international waters. However, the legal framework of the 
international law of water sharing is not limited to these conventions; customary 
international law is derived from bilateral and multilateral agreements or treaties, and 
further derived from case law, such as opinio juris, and practices of the states, comprising 
jus cogen principles established by such practices.52 The practices and case law serving as 
customary international law can also be derived from judgments of international courts or 
international arbitrations, in furtherance of certain conventions relating to the international 
                                                     
51 Patricia Wouters & Ruby Moynihan, Water Security – Legal Frameworks and the UN 
Watercourses Convention, in THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: 
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 336, 
346 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013). 
52 THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW & SOCIAL CONTRACT136 
(2015). 
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law of international waters more generally.53 Similarly, the opinions of renowned 
academics are useful to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in ascertaining customary 
international law.54 
When there is no neutral authority serving to regulate the legal frameworks of international 
law, or to represent the juridical positions of aggrieved weak states, the machinery of 
customary international law (CIL) seems a primitive legal system. This, coupled with a 
lack of an enforcement mechanism, appears inadequate.55 Nevertheless, CIL is not a wholly 
ineffective system for providing rules, as it still holds merit. Yet, owing to its shortfall to 
provide adequate punitive measures or enforcement mechanisms, the only available 
remedy under CIL is to take unilateral forceful retaliation.56 That will only ensure justice 
for the powerful and atrocities against the poor and weak, because the rich will always be 
able to muscle their way to meet their interests. For these reasons, CIL is considered a 
catastrophic way of resolving water sharing conflicts in international waters among co-
                                                     
53 Id. 
54 CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14 (2005). 
55 See generally LEONARD M. HAMMER, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES (2016). 
56 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Nile as a Legal and Political Structure, in THE SCARCITY 
OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL & POLITICAL RESPONSES 121, 123 (Edward H.P. Brans et 
al. eds., 1997). 
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riparian states.57 
B. Developments in Water Sharing International Law 
It was soon after World War I that international organizations started to prioritize 
multilateral water sharing treaties with non-navigational usage.58 However, countries 
around the globe did not show much enthusiasm in joining hands and forming such a 
mechanism. As a result, the Convention of Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting 
More than One State of 1923 is unique of that era. This instrument acknowledged the water 
rights of co-riparian states, and obliged signatory states to assess the interests of co-riparian 
states when devising water usage components.59 
By the middle of the twentieth century, owing to a surge in population and amplified 
agrarian and industrial economies, a water usage mechanism with regard to non-
navigational usage became more prominent. These mounting apprehensions about water 
shortcomings and lack of a mechanism to regulate water use shaped the 1966 Rules on the 
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, better known as the Helsinki Rules,60 formed 
                                                     
57See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE U.S & THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 29 (, 
2004). 
58 Robert Mrljić, Challenges of Environmental Protection in Times of Armed Conflict, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 119, 134 ( Massimiliano Montini 
& Slavko Bogdanovic eds., 2011). 
59 Id. 
60 SLAVKO BOGDANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES, at xv (2001). 
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by a team of experts serving the International Law Association (ILA).61 The Helsinki Rules 
covered navigational and non-navigational uses of water resources; they were developed 
by judiciously and empirically evaluating state practices in regard to water apportionment. 
This was ultimately meant to establish international laws to regulate the reasonable sharing 
and management of water resources among co-riparian states for international rivers.62 
Later, in 1970, a Finnish delegation proposed to the United Nations that the “progressive 
development and codification of the rules of international law relating to international 
watercourses” must be included in agendas of the General Assembly (GA).63 This Finnish 
proposal was approved by member states and the GA embraced Resolution 2669; 
subsequently, the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC, a body of the GA) 
was tasked with conducting a study to form a legal framework for international rivers for 
the co-riparian states.64 Consequently, after almost 30 years of research and formulation, 
in 1997 ILC drafted the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (UNWC). This convention is a multilateral treaty that 
specifically covers non-navigational uses and the management of international waters, 
                                                     
61 Id. 
62 ANTOINETTE HILDERING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT 47 (2004). 
63 LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 
(2013). 
64 Patricia Wouters, Editor’s Foreword, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE at xiii, xxi (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997). 
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establishing a set of universally accepted progressive principles regarding the non-
navigational uses of waters.65 
In 2004, the ILA further proposed the Berlin Rules of Water Resources to succeed its 
previous Helsinki Rules.66 These new rules were needed because the old framework did 
not cater groundwater resources and environmental aspects in its principles for water 
sharing.67 The Berlin Rules were meant to cover all aspects of freshwater resources, while 
specifically considering the environmental aspects connected with water management.68 
On the progressive discourse, in 2008 the ILC adopted a new instrument, the Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (DALTA) to cater to evolving water management 
needs, this time to specifically accommodate groundwater. This new mechanism was only 
                                                     
65 NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATERCOURSES 115 (2010). 
66 ROBERT MALIVA & THOMAS MISSIMER, ARID LANDS WATER EVALUATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 958 ( Rod Allan et al. eds., 2012). 
67 Id. 
68 See ONITA DAS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT: FILING THE GAPS 
WITH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, in WAR AND THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW APPROACHES TO 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICT 129, 153 ( Rosemay 
Rayfuse ed., 2014). 
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promulgated within the period of five years of research, mainly because the narrative 
principles within this instrument reflected the core values of the UNWC.69 
The UNWC came into force in the year 2014, with only the bare minimum 35 ratifications 
required.70 By contrast, DALTA wasintended to become a reference manuscript regarding 
the management of groundwater resources, and was not meant to become treaty law.71 
Together, both legal frameworks provide an international legal mechanism to manage river 
waters and groundwaters among co-riparian states and aquifer states, and are intended to 
be respected by the whole world.72 Concernedly, both instruments stand on universally 
accepted legal principles, such as the principle of the equitable apportionment of freshwater 
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and the principle to oblige by the rule not to harm co-riparian states.73 In total, these 
instruments represent principles in the form of obligations to cooperate with co-riparian 
states in order to curtail conflicts and endorse peaceful mechanisms for sharing waters.74 
Both instruments further state that co-riparian states must cooperate with each other in 
forming commissions and exchanging water information on a regular basis, and must notify 
each other about their mechanical works beforehand and seek the consent of co-riparian 
states to avoid conflicts and wars.75 The UNWC obliges member states to share information 
relating to water quality, conditions, and mechanisms, and further mandates that data of a 
“hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological or ecological nature” must be exchanged 
with the co-riparian states.76 The UNWC provides mechanisms to regulate such exchange 
of information and notifications.77 
Similarly, DALTA establishes an obligation on neighboring states sharing groundwater, 
that one state must not pollute groundwater, which can potentially harm the interests of 
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neighboring aquifer countries.78 Since scientifically there is little known regarding 
groundwater implications, caution must be exercised when using such water resources. 
Moreover, DALTA obliges aquifer countries to protect discharge and recharge regions for 
groundwater.79 This is because the administration of these regions is largely responsible 
for the fluctuating quality of groundwater.80 In other words, the engagements in such 
regions influence the quality of aquifers in neighboring regions. Similarly, industrial and 
agrarian activities can also impact the quality of aquifers. Therefore, DALTA also provides 
regulations regarding these activities.81 
As a result, the relevant legal authority for international water conflicts remains the 
conventions of the UN. These conventions represent true international law regarding the 
utilization of international waters.82 
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IV. CODIFICATIONS 
The most notable codifications pertaining the international law of water include the 
International Law Association’s Helsinki Rules of 1966, their successor, the Berlin Rules 
of 2004, the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses of 1997, UNECE’s UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992, and the Draft Articles on 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers of 2008, although through conventions and treaties 
there have been several other notable efforts to form a legal framework to equitably and 
peacefully share freshwater among co-riparian states. 
However, only the most appropriate and most acclaimed international instruments will be 
discussed in this section. Section 3.1 will only cover the UNWC and Section 3.2 will only 
look at DALTA. 
A. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(UNWC) 
Sometimes also referred to as the UN Watercourses Convention, UNWC remains an 
authority for the principles and regulations in the law of international waters.83 This 
instrument was drafted in 1997 but came into force in 2014, when it was ratified by the 
                                                     
83 United Nations Treaty Collections, UNITED NATIONS, https://perma.cc/V8ZR-TVBY 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
 111 
necessary 35 participants. This framework not only mandates cooperation among co-
riparian states but also devises water management guidelines.84 
This convention has only received 36 ratifications over the course of 17 years.85 Many 
powerful countries have refrained from ratifying this instrument to avoid legal implications 
regarding harming or injuring lower riparian states. For instance, Turkey, India, and the 
USA have refrained from being parties to this treaty. Almost all European countries have 
ratified it, though the treaty was meant to form regulations for all UN member states.86 
Regardless of the reservations by several countries, UNWC is in force and is applicable to 
all UN member states.87 This instrument obliges member states to refrain from harming 
co-riparian states, and mandates that water sharing must be equitable.88 The principles and 
obligations established by the UNWC will be set out in detail in the next section. These 
include the principle of equitably sharing water resources with co-riparian states, the 
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obligation not to harm co-riparian states by way of managing international shared waters, 
and the obligation to notify concerned riparian states about future works on water 
resources.89 
B. Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifiers (DALTA) 
GA Resolutions A/RES/63/124 and 66/104 adopted the Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers of 2008 in 2011; these articles and resolutions constitute 
international guidance for sharing groundwater resources among aquifer states.90 These 
instruments call upon states to “to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for 
the proper management of their transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions 
of these draft articles.”91 These provisions urge nations to counteract and control the water 
pollution of groundwater. Co-aquifer states are invited through this instrument to follow 
these guidelines in forming their respective treaty laws.92 Until this instrument was 
adopted, there was no clear body that provided concrete guidelines regarding the utilization 
and preservation of groundwater among co-aquifer states, so it is in itself an achievement, 
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reaching a unanimous and peaceful management tool for the sharing and protection of 
groundwater.93 
V. PRINCIPLES AND OBLIGATIONS 
This section will provide thorough analyses of the underlying principles established by the 
UNWC and DALTA. Section 4.1 will explain what the principle of the equitable and 
reasonable utilization of international watercourses entails. Section 4.2 will elucidate the 
obligation of not to cause harm to other co-riparian states. 
A. Principle of the Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of an International Watercourse 
Since the most distinguished and appreciated principle for water sharing among co-riparian 
states is the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization,” it is largely accepted by the 
global community.94 It was the UNWC that established this universally agreed principle 
for sharing waters among co-riparian states. This principle requires the equitable water 
apportionment by all nations alike. Article 5 of the UNWC reads as follows. 
Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In 
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by 
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watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests 
of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection 
of the watercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and 
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner. Such in participation includes both the right to utilize the 
watercourse and the duty to co-operate in the protection and development 
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.95 
All states that have river basins of international waters within their territories are rightfully 
entitled to use waters from these rivers within their territories.96 However, Article 5 
mandates that such utilization must be practiced in a fashion that is both equitable and 
reasonable.97 The idea is to utilize the shared international water basin by acquiring the 
benefits of all water resources in a protectable, sustainable, and reasonable way, while 
keeping the interests of co-riparian states in mind. Article 5 further states that future plans 
for devising the mechanism for water developments on such international watercourses 
must also be reasonable and equitable, in such a manner that they sustainably utilize the 
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benefits of these waters and yet cooperate with co-riparian states to protect their interests.98 
This principle of equitable and reasonable water apportionment has been universally 
acclaimed,99 and state practices around the globe demonstrate an endorsement of this 
principle, which is largely due to the juridical and rational managerial element of this water 
sharing principle. Various international courts of justice and forums of arbitration have 
used this principle in their adjudications.100 
The staple node of this principle maintains that all countries are sovereign nations and no 
state is superior to another: that all countries are equal in the equation of balance of 
justice.101 For this reason, the principle entails that every country that shares the basin of 
any international water river basin has a right to use those waters as a collective resource.102 
Within this discourse, upper and lower riparian states are equal, and the right of the upper 
riparian state is no more than that of the lower riparian state sharing same international 
river water basins. Nevertheless, the principle also advocates that the implementation of 
this right must not interfere with the interests of other co-riparian states.103 
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Further, this principle also entails two more basic notions of managing international shared 
waters. The first suggests that the equitable utilization does not necessitate two precisely 
equal apportionments for two riparian states that share international river waters basins. 
This is because the principle gives due regard to the shared water basin along with other 
contingent aspects in its equation, and maintains that water apportionment must be 
reasonable.104 So, if two countries share a river basin then the countries will not get an 
equal amount of the waters; other aspects of requirements and utilization of waters will be 
weighed in the equation to calculate each nation’s fair share. The second idea of this 
principle is that equitable and reasonable apportionment does not mean that the state with 
cutting-edge technologies, possessing the means to more effectively use river waters, will 
be allowed a larger water share.105 For instance, if the upper riparian state is a financially 
strong nation, it cannot exploit the water share of the lower riparian state by building more 
water management machinery at the courses of international waters. 
This principle of sharing water is not wholly inflexible pertaining to water apportionment, 
but rather it responds to emerging and evolving environs of utilizing water apportionment 
by weighing in all facets of the interests of co-riparian states.106 The reasonable water 
apportionment among co-riparian states is only feasible through this element of the 
principle. But this aspect necessitates that all characteristics and factors of a given situation 
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must be evaluated when mechanizing any utilization of international waters by co-riparian 
states.107 These factors and aspects include geological, social, economic, and 
environmental factors, and also contain the factors of alternative procedures, sustainability, 
and the protection of waters.108 Furthermore, these aspects can be further managed by 
keeping fluctuating natural or manmade unforeseeable factors in mind. Consequently, the 
water apportionment principles mandate that the management of water use must be 
regularly and continuously reviewed, owing to its evolving multifaceted characteristics.109 
B. Obligation Not to Cause Harm 
The second respected and acclaimed principle under international water sharing law is the 
obligation not to harm other co-riparian states, which is better known as the “no harm rule.” 
The UNWC contains this obligation in its Article 7, which reads as follows. 
Article 7: Obligation not to cause harm 
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other watercourse states. 
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse state, 
the states whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement 
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to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the 
provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected state, to 
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the 
question of compensation.110 
This Article prohibits co-riparian states from harming or injuring the interests of each other 
while utilizing international freshwater. This harm can be defined as polluting water flows, 
decreasing water quantities unreasonably, de-silting waters, harming the environment, and 
navigating watercourses.111 
This obligation of not to harm other states is based on the three integrated notions of sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your own as not to harm that of another), good 
neighborliness, and/or of abuse of rights.112 All three of these notions pertain to the 
conflicts among states. The primary nexus here is that the actions of one state within its 
territories must not harm or injure the interests of any other state. 
However, it is appropriate to note that this obligation not to harm other states—which is 
similar to the principle of equitably and reasonably utilizing waters—is not inflexible. But 
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it adapts in terms of the harm created for the other state, by evaluating contingent aspects 
of the situation.113 
One aspect of this principle is reflected within the language of the Article itself, where it is 
explicitly drafted that the harm inflicted must be significant in its effect.114 This contention 
is also asserted by state practices and case law, where it is repeatedly maintained that harm 
must be substantial and not be trivial to give rise to reciprocal or punitive measures.115 
Nevertheless, the line that differentiates a trivial harm from substantial harm is vague, and 
therefore contingent upon aspects of the individual case in any given situation. 
Another aspect of this principle is that it conditions the widely practiced notion of due 
diligence, by which co-riparian states are not only required to own the injuries they have 
caused during the course of their actions as damages after they have been administered; 
they are also required in advance to take all measures necessary to avoid such injurious or 
harmful effects.116 This aspect of due diligence further suggests that such measures must 
also take all contingent factors of a given situation into account. Finally, due diligence 
entails that these measures should be undertaken at the national level, where appropriate 
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statutory proceedings should anticipate the effects of management and implementation.117 
Moreover, this principle does not particularly take the side of the lower riparian states, to 
which the same obligation not to harm co-riparian states applies equally. The infliction of 
harm by a lower riparian state to an upper riparian state may seem improbable but it is 
not.118 For instance, heavy and unreasonable water usage of the lower riparian state could 
potentially harm the upper riparian state, by requiring that upper riparian decrease its water 
usage, as the river water is insufficient for the lower riparian state. So, in this sense, the 
reasonable utilization of waters and the no harm rule are also applicable to lower riparian 
states.119 Nonetheless, the no harm rule cannot absolutely restrict the upper riparian state 
from installing development works over the international watercourses. 
No harm obligation categorically proscribes “appreciable harm, [or sensible harm,] or 
significant harm, and substantial injury” over a co-riparian state, be it an upper riparian or 
a lower riparian state.120 Thus, the implication here is that the overall water usage is 
reasonable and equitable or not. The case law of a German court in this regard concluded 
that “[o]ne must consider not only the absolute injury caused to the neighboring State, but 
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also the relation of the advantage gained by one to the injury caused to the other.”121 This 
ruling integrates the principle of equitable and reasonable water utilization with the 
obligation not to harm by suggesting that a co-riparian state must not only not harm the 
other riparian states in the international watercourses, but also weigh the equitableness and 
reasonableness of their activities, which then will be rationally and judiciously applicable 
on upper riparian states and as well as on the lower riparian states.122 
VI. PROCEDURAL DUTIES 
Procedural obligations are essentially and significantly necessary in the international law 
of water sharing for two main reasons. One reason is that the procedural rules lay the 
foundations for the legal mechanism to uphold the legal machinery of other obligations and 
principles. The other objective is that these procedural obligations can avoid major 
conflicts by anticipating the rules of the game beforehand.123 
These obligations include “the obligation of prior notification, the obligation to exchange 
data and information, the obligation to consult with potentially affected states, the 
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obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the central and 
embracing obligation to cooperate.”124 
This section will briefly set out these obligations one by one, in view of draft writings 
within international instruments and their interpretations in light of customary international 
law. 
A. The Obligation to Notify Planned Activities to Concerned or Affected States 
Article 12 of the UNWC establishes the principle of the obligation to notify concerned 
riparian states about the planned measures of a state. Article 12 states as follows. 
Article 12: Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse 
effects 
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned 
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse 
States, it shall provide those States with timely notification thereof. Such 
notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information, 
including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in order to enable 
the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.125 
                                                     
124 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
art. 8-9, 12, 24, May 21, 1997, 51 U.N.T.S. 49. 
125  Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
art. 12, May 21, 1997, 51 U.N.T.S. 49. 
 123 
This Article obliges all states to notify other concerned co-riparian states about the planned 
activities of managerial concerns over the waters and about their potential adverse effects 
against the concerned states.126 The most potent and comprehensible approach behind such 
obligations suggests that such an obligation will help affected states prepare for and 
anticipate the consequences of legal, economical, geological, financial, and other 
contingent aspects.127 
For this reason, in addition to notification, it is further necessitated by this Article that such 
communication by a state must accompany certain crucial information reports. These 
include technical data and concerned knowledge, along with environmental impact 
assessments (EIA)128 so that a concerned state can timely anticipate the adverse effects of 
the planned activities.129 However, it is relevant to note that this obligation to notify is not 
applicable solely to the upper riparian states; lower riparian states are also obliged to 
prepare reports and brief upper riparian states regarding the possible adverse effects of their 
planned activities against the concerns and interests of the upper riparian states.130 
Furthermore, the obligation to notify concerned states does not imply that such information 
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need be communicated only once, but such notification should be communicated timely 
and regularly to encompass the changing dynamics of the situation with even better 
analysis of technical data.131 This requirement is crucial in the overall equation of equitably 
and reasonably utilizing international watercourses, because this communication and the 
conveyance of data lay the foundations of evaluations to form a sound analysis of regional, 
social, economic, financial, geological, and other aspects of a situation by both riparian 
states. In the result, without this notification and exchange of data, effects over 
international waters are incalculable.132 
Articles 13 to 18 of the UNWC are also concerned with the notification process. These 
articles also oblige the notified state to reply to any notification as soon as possible.133 The 
UNWC further provides notification and the reply periods and also delivers procedural 
measures that are to be respected in the absence of any reply. Additionally, Article 14 
requires that the notifying state give further information required by notified state in order 
to better evaluate the circumstances.134 
B. The Requirement to Enter into Consultations for Managerial Purposes 
Article 24 of the UNWC establishes a procedural duty to enter into consultation. Article 
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24 states as follows. 
Article 24: Management 
1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into 
consultations concerning the management of an international water- 
course, which may include the establishment of a joint management 
mechanism 
2. For the purpose of this article, “management” refers, in particular to: 
a. planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse 
and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted, and 
b. otherwise promoting rational and optimal utilization, protection and 
control of the watercourse.135 
This Article is a procedural obligation that obliges co-riparian states to enter into 
consultation with each other for the managerial work of planned activities, so that 
conflicting interests can be peacefully and diplomatically resolved.136 
Consultation is not to be confused with the idea of acquiring consent of affected state. The 
notion of consent is set out in Article 14 of the UNWC, which states that, after notification, 
the notifying state cannot implement its planned activities without the due consent of the 
notified state. Article 14(b), regarding the actions of notifying states, reads that the 
notifying state “[s]hall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned 
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measures without the consent of the notified States.”137 
However, the scope of consultation is restricted by Article 24, and this capacity is strictly 
limited to the extent of managerial purposes, which is a first step forward to enter into the 
negotiating process of bilateral dialogues among co-riparian states. Through consultation, 
concerned states can share their interests and views regarding the planned activities in a 
more peaceful and acceptable manner.138 
C. The Duty to Prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
In addition to the implication of preparing an EIA by Article 12 of the UNWC, the duty to 
prepare an EIA has been generally acclaimed by international community.139 In fact, this 
obligation of preparing environmental feasibility report has evolved to become applicable 
international law, when in 2010 the ICJ established this duty in the case of Argentina v. 
Uruguay, better known as the Pulp Mills Case.140 The judgment of this case established 
that it is necessary to prepare an EIA in a situation “where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in 
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particular, on a shared resource.”141 
Here the underlying concept is that, before executing any planned activities, an EIA must 
be prepared to understand the environmental implications affecting the notifying country 
and other states that could potentially be adversely affected.142 This is to be prepared 
beforehand, to better understand the implications and thus avoid hazards and adverse 
effects and prevent or mitigate injury to the environment.143 
Sadly, owing to unenforceable impediments in international law, EIAs remain largely 
unexplored. So national legislation is persistently silent on its specifics. However, it is 
established that an EIA report must be prepared beforehand to assess the environmental 
implications of planned projects.144 
D. Duty to Cooperate with Co-Riparian States 
UNWC imposes a general obligation over co-riparian states to cooperate with each other 
to pacify regional water conflicts. The relevant Article of the UNWC states as follows. 
Article 8: General Obligation to Cooperate 
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1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to obtain optimal utilization 
and adequate protection of an international watercourse 
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may 
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed 
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and 
procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing 
joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions.145 
This obligation to cooperate encompasses all other principles and obligations, since the 
term “cooperation” can be described as “the voluntary coordinated action of two or more 
States which takes place under a legal regime and serves a specific objective . . . [t]o this 
extent it marks the effort of States to accomplish an object by joint action, where the 
activity of a single State cannot achieve the same result.”146 
Within the scope of this definition, all states are obliged to voluntarily share their views, 
concerns, and interests with other concerned states, so that the utilization of international 
water can be managed more effectively, equitably, and reasonably. However, it is 
appropriate to note that such cooperation is reciprocal in nature between the upper and 
lower riparian states, and entails continuous cooperation.147 
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Moreover, this cooperation cannot be enforced by mere implications in customary 
international law and by providing guidelines. Enforcement of this obligation is only 
possible by forming bilateral or multilateral water sharing treaties, where states 
unanimously agree to regulations entailing and upholding the said notions of cooperation 
through new articles in treaties. For this reason, Article 8(2) maintains that, to enforce 
cooperation among states, commissions may be formed along with joint mechanisms to 
function effectively.148 
E. Duty to Protect the Environment 
 
Customarily, international instruments, such as multilateral or bilateral treaties, are more 
concerned with the navigational uses of water and its apportionment, while ignoring the 
environmental impact of such watercourse diversions and their subsequent devastating 
impact on the ecosystem.149 However, in the recent times, the point of contention has 
moved more toward the nonnavigational uses of water and the safety of the environment 
during planned activities, such as the impacts of polluting international watercourses. For 
this reason, a new dawn of environmentally friendly system is emerging, where the 
ecosystem, environmental degradation, and the impact on the lives of flora and fauna are 
the main focus.150 
Therefore, treaties are now more oriented toward environmentally friendly agreements, 
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ensuring ecological harmony with water managerial projects by proscribing hazardous or 
calamitous activities toward the environment.151 
These environmental aspects include controlling pollution and water contamination, 
maintaining water quality, preserving flora and fauna in perpetual balance with nature, not 
disturbing ecosystems, and prohibiting deforestation.152 These emerging norms are readily 
reflected in modern treaties, UN conventions, and state practices, by which states are 
obliged to prevent injury against the environment by minimizing projects’ impacts on 
nature, and thus looking toward a sustainable future for the world.153 
In this regard, Article 12 of the UNWC requires states to prepare EIAs, and Article 21 
obliges states to prevent, reduce, and control water pollution.154 Similarly, Article 23 of the 
UNWC calls for the preservation of the marine environment.155 
F. Duty to Consider Water as a Vital Human Need 
While keeping in mind that water is vital for the survival of every nation, and in fact for 
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any living being, the UNWC’s Article 10 states as follows. 
Article 10: Relationship between uses 
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys priority over other uses. 
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international water course, it 
shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors set out in 
articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital 
human needs156 
The idea is that, since water is a building block for life, and water is vital for human 
survival, co-riparian states—while forming or establishing water sharing treaties—must 
consider water as an essential aspect of life, such that every person and hence each state 
has an innate requirement for water.157 This notion is more particularly applicable to water-
stressed countries, where large numbers of people have no access to drinkable water. 
Therefore, the wording of Article 10 of UNWC explicitly mentions water as a vital 
necessity for humankind, and urges states to give this aspect of water special regard while 
resolving any given water conflict, or while proposing water sharing treaties.158 
This requirement in UNWC is intended to encompass human sustainability, therefore both 
purposes of water usage—drinking purposes and agrarian purposes for the production of 
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food—come within the scope of this Article.159 Similarly, DALTA supplements the 
UNWC’s claims by stating that conflicting states must prioritize water and its vitality in 
sustainability while reasonably and equitably utilizing water.160 
Owing to the empowering nature of the notion of water’s vitality for humankind in DALTA 
and UNWC, international law and more specifically humanitarian international laws are 
acknowledging water as a basic human right. Here the main contention is that, while 
forming water apportionment treaties and regulations, water as a vital aspect of life must 
be given first priority.161 For instance, if the question in conflict is regarding power 
production, the assessment of water requirements for the basic needs of drinking and 
growing food will always be given priority over nonconsumptive purposes, such as water 
use for hydropower production. 
VII. GROUNDWATER 
This section will briefly touch upon the same principles, obligations, and duties of water 
utilization established by UNWC. However, this section will deal particularly with the 
scope of DALTA and its provisions with regard to groundwater/aquifers. 
While groundwater comprises just 30 percent of all freshwater and 1.7 percent of all water 
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on Earth, it is the most important source of water in almost all arid regions.162 It has not 
been substantially scrutinized by international law. Arguably, regulations set out in the 
UNWC in 1997 are applicable to groundwater usage, as the definitional approach in the 
convention describes international watercourses in the composition of groundwater. 
However, this inclusion of groundwaters with the water flows leaves out distant major 
aquifers, comprising a major amount of water. Furthermore, the drafting of Articles in the 
UNWC is tailored to accommodate international watercourses and their respective water 
flows. As a result, groundwater remains largely unregulated in the UNWC.163 
More particularly, DALTA specifically caters to the management and usage of 
groundwater. DALTA was promulgated by the ILC for the specific preservation and 
protection of groundwater.164 
DALTA meticulously follows the same principles and obligations established in the 
UNWC, and applies them to groundwater. For instance, the principles of the equitable 
utilization of water, the duty not to harm, the duty to cooperate, the duty to consult 
concerned states, the duty not to pollute or harm nature, and the obligation to share 
                                                     
162 USGS, Ground Water Storage, https://perma.cc/V5RA-6SJT (last visited April 12, 
2017). 
163 Joseph W. Delapenna & Flavia R. Loures, Filling Gaps: A protocol to govern 
groundwater resources of relevance to international law, in & THE UN WATERCOURSES 
CONVENTION IN FORCE 270, 284 (2013).  
164 Supra note 104, at 35.  
 134 
technical information are all also covered in DALTA.165 
Article 4 of DALTA acknowledges the equitable and reasonable utilization of international 
aquifers and further recommends sustainable and efficient utilization.166 Similarly, Article 
6 obliges states not to harm other international aquifer states,167 Article 7 imposes a duty 
to cooperate, and Article 8 obliges states to share technical data and relevant information.168 
Moreover, Article 10 urges the protection of the environment and Article 12 obliges states 
to prevent, reduce, and control pollution.169 Article 14 forms the obligation to consult for 
managerial purposes.170 Finally, Article 16 urges states to cooperate with other states in 
regard to all the aforementioned principles and obligations to use peaceful measures to 
                                                     
165 See DELAPENNA, supra note 163, at 236. 
166 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 40-41 (2008). 
167 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 46 (2008). 
168 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 48, 50 (2008). 
169 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 10, 12, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 54, 57 (2008). 
170 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 63 (2008). 
 135 
resolve a likely conflict.171 Additionally, DALTA provides regulations pertaining to the 
recharge and discharge zones of aquifers, to curtail water contamination and the protection 
of the environment.172 
VIII. IWT V. UNWC 
Given the lack of consideration in other treaties of the equitable principles, the 
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, between India and Pakistan, is considered one of the 
best treaties regarding water apportionment.173 This treaty incorporated most modern 
aspects, with only few exceptions. To measure this, it is relevant to compare the IWT with 
the UNWC. This section will analyze the IWT, and it will examine whether the IWT 
contains all required aspects that the UNWC or most modern water apportionment treaties 
manage to encompass. However, the reason that the UNWC is so generic in its form is 
because it was meant to apply to the whole world.174 The IWT was tailored to the needs of 
India and Pakistan, which should be kept in mind while assessing the differences between 
the instruments.175 Moreover, it is also notable that neither Pakistan nor India has yet 
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ratified the UNWC, despite their ongoing water management conflicts, for unknown 
reasons.176 
A. Scope 
 
The preamble of the IWT provides its scope, which is limited to the governments of 
Pakistan and India, with the World Bank a neutral party, brokering the treaty.177 
Correspondingly, pertaining to the international watercourses, the IWT only specifies 
regulations over six eastern and western rivers, including the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi, and 
Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, respectively. Moreover, the IWT also explicitly maintains that 
all the lakes and tributaries that contribute to these rivers, also come within its scope.178 
On the other hand, UNWC is meant to accommodate all states in the world that share 
international watercourses. In this regard, Article 4 of the UNWC states as follows. 
1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to 
become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire 
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant 
consultations.” 
2. “A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be 
affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed 
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watercourse agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a 
particular project, program or use is entitled to participate in consultations on 
such an agreement and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good 
faith with a view to becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is 
thereby affected.179 
This wording makes it sufficiently clear that, with regard to international watercourses, 
UNWC covers all international waters and all states that share such international waters. 
The scope of the UNWC is wider than that of the IWT. Moreover, the IWT only covers six 
rivers and two states, whereas the UNWC caters to all international rivers and all states 
sharing them. However, it must be noted that the IWT is only a bilateral treaty between 
two nations, which was meant to cater to the needs of two states,180 and UNWC is an 
international convention, whose purpose was to cover the whole world.181 
Moreover, with regard to water usage, there is one very prominent difference between the 
IWT and the UNWC. That is, UNWC only deals with nonnavigational uses of water,182 
whereas the IWT covers both navigational and nonnavigational uses of water. 
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The IWT and the UNWC take a watercourse approach, by which a land contingent with 
the watercourses or flows also comes under the scope of this legal framework. Some 
countries even imposed reservations with the same term so as to escape the scope, and 
sided with the basin approach for water apportionment. In this regard, the IWT clearly 
expressed, that “this Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each Party in relation to 
the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidental 
thereto.”183 
The UNWC has set limits to define the scope of the treaty, by which it has an obligation to 
include referred watercourses within its scope. The UNWC states that, “[w]here a 
watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more watercourse States, it shall 
define the waters to which it applies.”184 Further, in its preamble the IWT defined the scope 
of its regulations pertaining to watercourses. Therefore, it can be safely ascertained that the 
IWT and the UNWC complement each other on the aspect of the scope of the agreement. 
B. Principles, Obligations, and Duties 
To define the principles of the apportionment of international watercourses, Articles II, III, 
and IV of the IWT deal with the eastern and western rivers, and the duties of each party 
are set out accordingly. IWT equitably divides the international watercourses and allocates 
the three eastern rivers for India’s unrestricted usage, while allowing Pakistan to use the 
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waters of the eastern rivers for non-consumptive, domestic, and limited agricultural 
purposes.185 Conversely, the IWT allocates the three western rivers for Pakistan’s 
unrestricted usage, while allowing India to use the waters of the western rivers for non-
consumptive, domestic, limited agricultural purposes and hydroelectric power.186 
However, the IWT also allows India to build water management apparatuses on the western 
rivers. This enables India to build storage facilities on the rivers up to “1.25 MAF for 
general purposes, 1.6 MAF for power and 0.75 MAF for flood protection.”187 
As set out here, the principles of the IWT seem equitable and reasonable when the 
superficial understandings suggest that all waters are equally divided among two 
neighboring watercourses states, where each nation shares three rivers through the IWT. 
But a closer examination of the IWT will portray an entirely different version of these 
principles for water apportionment. It is noted that “[t]he three (3) eastern rivers allocated 
to India had a cumulative flows of 33 Million Acre Feet (MAF) out of which India was 
only utilizing 3 MAF and left with 30 MAF for future expansion. Against this, Pakistan 
did not get any additional water and had to develop storages for its future requirements.”188 
As a result, it can be safely determined that the underlying principles of the UNWC, which 
make it essential to equitably and reasonably share international watercourses, are not 
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thoroughly applied and reflected in the IWT.189 
Nonetheless, there are many aspects of the basic principles that are followed by the IWT, 
reflecting particular obligations and principles promulgated by the UNWC. For instance, 
the principle of the obligation not to harm other concerned co-riparian states, established 
by the UNWC, is reciprocally accommodated in the IWT.190 Similarly, the duty to notify a 
concerned state about planned activities is also notably preserved in the IWT.191 
Furthermore, the IWT preserves the obligation to not to pollute or contaminate waters,192 
which is identical to the obligation under the UNWC. These reflected obligations and 
duties, acting as principles in the IWT, prove that the UNWC and the IWT are in 
conformity with each other, essentially satisfying the principles of the equitable and 
reasonable utilization of international waters and the obligation not to cause harm.193 
Furthermore, the UNWC obliges all watercourse states to cooperate with other concerned 
states and thereunder exchange all information on a regular basis, so that management of 
water apportionment can be executed effectively.194 Analogously, the IWT also obliges 
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both parties to exchange all technical data and information with each other, to make the 
other party aware of adverse effects, and to make water management more efficient.195 This 
aspect of the IWT is a precise reflection of the obligation under the UNWC, where it is 
obligatory to exchange technical information and to cooperate with concerned states.196 
However, the IWT does not unreservedly conform to one basic characteristic of the 
UNWC. Article 6 of the UNWC provides a list of contingent factors that should be kept in 
mind while utilizing international watercourses.197 The IWT does not explicitly provide 
such a list of aspects involved in water apportionment, although it does set out some sorts 
of rights and try to encompass not all but a few contingent facets of the situation.198 For 
instance, the IWT provides procedural arrangements to accommodate financial 
transactions between states to construct water management infrastructure.199 This 
adjustment within the IWT covers the economic aspect of the situation, which is a 
requirement under the UNWC. Similarly, by allowing India to install hydroelectric power 
generation plants over the western rivers, IWT furnishes a social aspect of the required 
needs.200 Analogously, within its evaluation the IWT covers domestic, industrial, and 
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human needs,201 which are mirrored in the UNWC.202 These various aspects of water 
apportionment in the IWT reflect various contingent aspects of the UNWC. However, 
several other factors enlisted in the UNWC, such as the characteristics of environmental, 
population, and climatic aspects of water apportionment, are largely neglected in this 
bilateral treaty. Similarly, the obligation to seek the consent of the relevant state after 
notification is also not adapted in the IWT.203 
C. Devising Institution 
The UNWC in its articulation merely suggests that concerned parties can devise a 
commission as a mechanism to enforce water management regulations. Article 8 of the 
UNWC states that “watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms 
or commissions.”204 Article 24 of the UNWC states that “consultations concerning the 
management of an international watercourse … may include the establishment of a joint 
management mechanism.”205 Analogously, IWT obliges both parties to form a Permanent 
Indus Commission, in which both states will have their respective agents to represent 
them.206 The IWT further states that this commission is responsible for enforcing the 
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regulations of the treaty, and that commissioners are obliged to provide annual reports to 
their respective governments.207 Seeing the institutional mechanism of the IWT, it can be 
concluded that, in establishing a legal framework, the IWT supersedes the UNWC. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the discussion above and the principles and obligations that regulations 
in international instruments counterbalance the formation of regional instruments. 
Considering the wordings of the UNWC and the DALTA, it can be easily comprehended 
that the promulgated rules are acclaimed universally, even on the regional stage.208 These 
established norms and principles in turn lay the foundation for the formation of treaties and 
agreements around the globe.209 Any given instrument largely follows such principles 
because the context, intentions, and views of the agreement will adapt to the ambiguities 
of agreements or treaties. Comparably, when a regional instrument lacks clarification on 
any aspect of a situation, or where there is no instrument to institute regulations, such 
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international principles can cater to the required need and operate reasonably, equitably, 
justifiably, and impartially.210 
As a final note, treaty law and agreements at regional or watercourse level define the true 
rules and regulations of any given situation, forming the legal framework within certain 
requirements.211 But it is germane to note that international law through multilateral water 
treaties is starting to encompass groundwater/aquifers and any tangible or anticipatable 
water sharing aspects, along with providing a dispute resolution mechanism and 
environmental protection regulations.212 Such instruments cover water conflicts where 
there is no mutually agreed treaty. This is also the emerging need of this time, since the 
majority of fresh water is not governed by any kind of treaty law.213 
So, for regions where there is no agreement, and as a guiding principle for international 
law, be it case law or customary law, UNWC and DALTA propose justifiable water 
apportionment principles where the underlying principle is that water must be utilized in 
an equitable and reasonable manner. Furthermore, this utilization must be undertaken 
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without injuring or harming co-riparian states or nature, and while cooperating with 
concerned states and restraining from polluting the environment or water. 
Correspondingly, although the IWT was formulated decades before the UNWC was 
imagined, the IWT provides and covers several aspects of the principles and obligations 
later established by the UNWC, such as the principle of the equitable and reasonable 
utilization of international watercourses, the obligation not to harm other concerned 
riparian state, and the duty to notify other states about planned activities. Nonetheless, there 
are certain contingent aspects of water apportionment that are still not reflected in the IWT, 
such as the obligation to protect the environment, the population factor, the obligation to 
seek consent, and the obligation to prepare EIAs. Nonetheless, the case law pertaining to 
the IWT has explicated that the obligation to prepare EIAs is unavoidable.214 On the other 
hand, as far as DALTA is concerned, the IWT is silent on the use of freshwater resources 
of groundwater/aquifers. 
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